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We consider conditions under which the representation of the world
available to a boundedly rational decision-maker, whose awareness in-
creases over time, constitutes an adequate `small world' (in the sense
of Savage 1954) for the assessment of a given decision. Equivalently,
we consider whether boundedly rational decision-makers who gradu-
ally become aware of all relevant contingencies, can pursue a strategy
that is sequentially consistent. We derive conditions on beliefs and
preferences that yield a separation between the set of propositions of
which the boundedly rational decision-maker is aware and those of
which she is unaware and show that these conditions are sucient to
ensure sequential consistency.
JEL Classication: D80, D82
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11 Introduction
Bayesian decision theory and its generalizations provide a powerful set of
tools for analyzing problems involving state-contingent uncertainty. In prob-
lems of this class, decision-makers begin with a complete specication of
uncertainty in terms of a state space (a set of possible states of the world).
The ultimate problem may be formulated as a choice among a set of acts,
represented as mappings from the state space to a set of possible outcomes.
In many applications, there is an intermediate stage in which the decision-
maker may obtain information in the form of a signal about the state of the
world, represented by a renement of the state space. That is, any possible
realization of the signal means that the true state of the world must lie in
some subset of the state space.
The starting point of Bayesian analysis is the state space, representing all
possible contingencies. A fundamental diculty with such a state-contingent
models of decision-making under uncertainty is that, in reality, decision-
makers are boundedly rational and do not possess a complete state-contingent
description of the uncertainty they face. Decision makers cannot foresee and
consider all the contingencies relevant to their decisions (Grant & Quiggin,
2007a&b, Heifetz, Meier & Schipper, 2006, Halpern & Rego, 2006a).
In this paper, we consider conditions under which the representation of
the world available to a boundedly rational decision-maker, whose awareness
increases over time, constitutes an adequate `small world' (in the sense of Sav-
age 1954) for the assessment of a given decision. Equivalently, we consider
whether boundedly rational decision-makers who gradually become aware of
all relevant contingencies, can pursue a strategy that is sequentially consis-
tent. Here sequential consistency means that, reconsidering past decisions in
the light of increased awareness about the possible states of the world, but
disregarding information received after the decision was made, the individual
would still regard the decisions as ex ante optimal.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst briey outline in section 2 a
model we developed in Grant and Quiggin (2007a) that provides a represen-
tation in which the state of the world is represented by the truth values for a
set of propositions (the syntactic representation). We use this representation
to describe a game with nature, and derive the expected utility of possible
2strategies from two viewpoints. The external viewpoint is that of an un-
boundedly rational (but not, in general, perfectly informed) decision-maker
with access to a complete set of states of the world and an associated set of
propositions rich enough to describe all possible states. The second is that
of a boundedly rational decision-maker with limited awareness. In Section
3 we derive conditions on beliefs and preferences that yield a separation be-
tween the set of propositions of which the boundedly rational decision-maker
is aware and those of which she is unaware
In4 we present a dynamic model in which individual awareness increases
over time, reaching the maximal (relevant) level of awareness when the game
concludes. We derive our main result, showing that the conditions of Sec-
tion 3 are sucient to ensure sequential consistency. We conclude with a
discussion of some of the implications of our analysis.
2 Structure and notation
We adapt the model of choice under uncertainty developed by Grant and
Quiggin (2007a) in which an individual does not necessarily possess a com-
plete description of the world. As we discuss below, the underpinnings
of this model can be embedded in a dynamic tree structure that can be
viewed as an extensive-form game between Nature and our boundedly ra-
tional decision-maker, where the awareness of the decision-maker increases
gradually through learning and discovery. But for our purposes here, it is
sucient for us to model all decisions and beliefs in terms of binary (elemen-
tary) propositions that either nature or the decision-maker determines the
truth value. The key distinction will be between the external viewpoint and
the limited or restricted viewpoint of the decision-maker.
Let the set of states of the world from the external viewpoint be 
. We
focus on the representation 
 = 2P0  2P1, where P0 = fp0
1;:::;p0
Mg is a
nite set of `elementary' propositions about the world that are determined
by nature, and P1 = fp1
1;:::;p1
Ng is a nite set of `elementary propositions
(i.e. [binary] decisions) that the individual controls. Each proposition in
P0 is a statement such as `The fourth named storm of the year is a force
ve hurricane and makes landfall at Galveston.' Each proposition in P1 is
a statement such as `The decision-maker buys ood insurance for her house
3in Houston.' Thus, an exhaustive description of the state of the world from
the external or objective viewpoint, consists of an evaluation of each of the
propositions in P0 and P1. With each proposition pi
n and each possible state
of the world ! in 
, a fully informed observer can associate a truth value
V (pi
n;!) 2 f0;1g, which will be 1 if pi
n is true and 0 if pi
n is false at !.
By way of contrast to the external viewpoint, we shall consider a decision
maker who has only limited awareness of the uncertainty embodied in 
. In
particular, there are propositions both in P0 and in P1 that she does not or















the `restricted' sets of propositions that she explicitly considers are under the















, be the sets of propo-
sitions that are controlled respectively, by nature and by her own decisions
that she currently does not consider when formulating her plan of action.
From the viewpoint of our partially aware decision-maker, any state of her
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The set of unconsidered decisions of nature and the set of unconsidered










where for each ! in 
































, i = 0;1.
A state of the world ! in 
, may be thus viewed as being jointly deter-
mined by a `complete strategy' chosen by nature, that is, a state of nature


















































We shall refer to (S0;S1)  ([0;1) \ Q)
2 as the (normal or strategic) game-
form associated with 
 and (S0
r;S1
r) as the restricted game-form for the
decision maker with limited awareness.
2.1 Decision-making in the `Large' and in the `Small'
For a nite set E, let (E) denote the set of probability distributions dened
on E.
Fix a set of states of the world 
, with associated sets of propositions P0
and P1.
A (fully aware) subjective expected utility maximizer (SEUM) decision-
maker for this large world is characterized by a belief 0 2 (S0), a conse-
quence function c : S0  S1 ! C, where C is a space of consequences, and a
utility index over consequences, u : C ! R. Choices for this individual are
then ranked according to their subjective expected utility. That is, for any
pair of strategies s1 or ~ s1 in S1, s1 is at least as good as ~ s1 if and only if
the subjective expected utility of the former is greater than or equal to the





























For a decision-maker who is only aware of propositions P0
r and P1
r, to
complete the description of her as a subjective expected utility maximizer for
the restricted game-form (S0
r;S1
r), requires specifying a belief 0
r 2 (S0
r), a
consequence function cr : S0
rS1
r ! Cr, where Cr is the space of consequences
of which she is aware, and a utility index over that space of consequences,
ur : Cr ! R. In the terminology of Savage, the restricted game-form (S0
r;S1
r)
may be regarded as a small world within which decision analysis may be
applied to choose among available strategies ^ s1

























5In the next section we shall specify circumstances in which even from the
fully informed perspective (S0;S1), the small world (S0
r;S1
r) is an appropriate
choice for modelling the decision among available strategies ^ s1
r in S1
r.
3 Consistent Small-world Bayesian Decisions
Suppose the `true' or `objective' uncertainty corresponds to 
, and the fully
aware SEU maximizer in the large world (S0;S1) is characterized by (0;c(:;:);u(:)).
We shall consider a (restricted) game-form given by (S0
r;S1
r). Notice the
marginal distributions over s0
r and s0












































Now consider a less than fully aware decision-maker who is a (small-world)
SEU maximizer characterized by (0
r;cr (:;:);ur (:)). An `optimal' choice ^ s1
r






























The question we address is the following. Under what conditions can we
be assured that the `optimal' choice ^ s1




r;cr (:;:);ur (:)), would be part of the optimal choice in the
large world (S0;S1) for the fully aware SEU maximizer (0;c(:;:);u(:)). If
these conditions are satised we say that the small world model is consistent
with the large world model.
The rst condition is the requirement that the consequence resulting from
the decisions of nature and the individual of which the individual is aware,
is separable from the consequence resulting from the decisions of nature and
the individual of which the individual is unaware. Moreover, the utility index
over this pair of consequences must have the so-called multiplicative form of
Keeney & Raia (1976).
Denition 1 (Multiplicative Separable Utility) The fully aware SEU
maximizer's utility over consequences in the large world is said to be multi-
plicatively separable with respect to the small-world SEU maximizer's utility
6if there exists a consequence space Cu, a consequence function cu : S0
uS1
u !

































































where k is a constant satisfying:
1 + kur (cr) > 0, for all cr 2 Cr,
and 1 + kuu (cu) > 0, for all cu 2 Cu.
The second condition is the requirement that nature's decisions over
propositions in P0
R are independently distributed with respect to the propo-
sitions in P0
u.
Denition 2 (Belief Independence) For all s0
r 2 S0




























To see that these two conditions are jointly sucient, it is enough to show
that for any ^ s1
r in S1


























































































































































and so (2) holds as required.
For the case k 6= 0, set
^ ur (cr) := 1 + kur (cr)














































































































































































































































































































































and again (2) holds as required.




























































































































































































































































and again (2) holds as required.
One example, common in applications, in which preferences admit a
multiplicative separable utility representation, is where the consequences
are monetary amounts and so can be added together, and the individual's
risk preferences over money lotteries exhibit constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA).
Example 1 (Monetary Consequences and CARA risk preferences)





u) = cr (s0
r;s1
r) + cu (s0
u;s1
u).
To see that monetary consequences with CARA risk preferences generate
multiplicatively separable utility, notice that for k =  1,
ur (cr) + uu (cu)   ur (cr)uu (cu)
= 1   exp( cr) + 1   exp( cu)   [1   exp( cr)][1   exp( cu)]
= 1   exp( cr)exp( cu) = 1   exp( [cr + cu]) = u(cr + cu)
An important point to note here is that discussion in terms of `bounded
rationality' does not imply (though it does not rule out) a focus on heuris-
tics inconsistent with standard decision theory. On the contrary, the limits
associated with bounded rationality are even sharper in relation to the appli-
cation of standard decision theory than in other cases. A heuristic decision
process may take account, in some form, of a broad and loosely dened
set of considerations more or less relevant to the decision in question. By
contrast, the requirements for a formal decision process, beginning with the
assignment of a prior probability distribution over the state space, and pro-
ceeding to updating posterior decision probabilities and contingent strategies
are so demanding that in practice, the number of propositions taken into ac-
count is not merely nite (this aspect of boundedness is logically necessary)
but commonly quite small. Hence, the derivation of conditions under which
a particular small world is appropriate should be of particular interest to
highly, but nevertheless boundedly rational decision-makers.
94 Dynamics and Sequentially Consistent Bayesian
Decisions
Our analysis so far has focused on the comparisons between a fully aware
decision-maker and one with limited awareness. It is straightforward to ex-
tend the analysis to the case of a set of decision-makers, ordered in terms
of awareness from the least aware to most aware: Such an ordering arises
naturally in the course of a history in which individuals become aware of (or
discover) new propositions over time, but do not forget propositions of which
they are already aware.
More generally, as in Halpern and Rego (2006b) or Grant and Quiggin
(2007b) we may consider extensive form games with Nature (or with other
players, but we will not pursue the multiagent case further here) in which
awareness increases as the game progresses, for example because an individual
is presented with a choice she or he had not previously anticipated. In this
case, the awareness of the decision-maker at any point in time will, in general,
depend on the history of the game up to that time. The possible awareness
states of the player are then partially ordered and (since awareness increases
along any given history) this ordering is consistent with the ordering of partial
histories generated by the dynamic structure of the game.
To put this into the notation introduced above we will consider a special
case in which the increase in awareness depends only on calendar time and not
the particular history of play up to that point in time. The line of argument
developed below, however, can be readily generalized to accommodate history
dependent increases in awareness as well.
Fix an objective state-space 






Tg be T element (ordered)
partitions of P0 and P1, respectively.1 Associated with each partition element
Pi
t is a `partial' strategy set Si
t where si
t in Pi
t corresponds to the rational
1By ordered we simply mean the partitions respect the indexing of propositions in Pi,




t0, then t > t0 implies n > n0. In addition, the
fact that both partitions have the same number of partitions is without loss of generality





























, i = 0;1.
The interpretation is that at the point in time t 2 f1;:::;Tg, the individ-
ual is aware of nature's propositions P0
1[P0
2 :::[P0
t and her own propositions
in P1
1 [ P1










game-form for the game against nature she perceives herself to be playing.
















! Ct where Ct is the space
of consequences of which she is aware at point t, a a utility index ut : Ct ! R.
Thus, by repeated application of the results derived above we may derive
conclusions concerning the dynamics of choice under conditions of limited,

















(and therefore with each
other) we say that the individual's model of the world is sequentially con-
sistent.
The rst restriction on the consequences and utility is the multivariate
analog of multiplicative separable utility.
Denition 3 (Sequential Multiplicative Separable Utility) For each
t = 2;:::;T, there exists a consequence space Ct, a consequence function
ct : S0
t  S1























































































> 0, for all c
t 1 2 C
t 1,
and 1 + ktut (ct) > 0, for all ct 2 Ct.
11The second is simply the multivariate extension of the independence of
the prior beliefs over the partial strategy sets of nature.









































2. For each t = 2;:::;T, and for all s0
1 2 S0





































Given the starting point t = 1, the individual perceiving (S0
1;S1
1) as the




1) (by multivariate belief independence), consequence func-
tion c1 : S0
1  S1
1 ! C1 and utility u1 : C1 ! R, chooses a strategy ^ s1
1
that maximizes her (perceived) subjective expected utility. At point t = 2,
the individual now is made aware of more of nature's choices and possible




2), the new game-form, with as-











2) ! C2 and utility u2 : C2 ! R. Applying the analy-
sis from the previous section, it readily follows that (sequential multivariate)
separable utility along with (multivariate) belief independence means that if
the decision maker were selecting her ex ante optimal prior strategy given her
new increased level of awareness, she could so by selecting an ex ante strategy
^ s1
1 + s1
2. That is, she need not reoptimize over S1
1. Moreover, with (multi-
variate) belief independence she can simply play the continuation strategy
^ s1
1 entails at point 2 given her planned responses to new information about
nature's choice of s0
1 that is revealed at point 2. And so, on for each point
thereafter from point t = 3; until point t = T, at which point she has become
fully aware of the nature of the uncertainty she is facing and her options.
125 Implications and concluding comments
The conditions derived above are quite stringent, which raises the questions
of how boundedly rational decision-makers should act. One way to address
this question is related to the work of Bordley and Hazen (1992) who consider
a single decision-maker and derive conditions similar to those presented above
to determine when it would be appropriate to apply expected utility theory
in the context of a restricted model similar to (S0
r;S1
r): Bordley and Hazen
argue that, if these conditions are not satised, the induced preferences over
strategies in (S0
r;S1
r) may be represented by non-expected utility preferences.
By contrast, the analysis here compares the perspective of boundedly ra-
tional decision-makers with that which they would take if they were fully
aware. This approach has a range of implications. First, consider the per-
spective of an external observer, with the possibility of intervening to aect
the choices of a boundedly aware decision-maker. Such an intervention might
simply involve making the decision-maker aware of some previously uncon-
sidered possibilities, or it might involve actions aimed at encouraging some
choices and discouraging others. Under the conditions derived above, in-
creasing the awareness of the decision-maker will not aect decisions, but
will add to the decision-makers computational burden and is thus undesir-
able. Similarly unless the external decision-maker has private and noncom-
municable information, as distinct from greater awareness of the possible set
of states, intervening directly will reduce the decision-makers welfare. Con-
versely, where the conditions derived above are not satised, intervention
may improve welfare.
As is shown by Grant and Quiggin (2007b, Proposition 11, p19) a bound-
edly aware decision-maker cannot know with certainty that there exist propo-
sitions of which they are unaware2. On the other hand, inductive reasoning
may be used to justify the belief that a given small-world model is incomplete,
and that expected utility may need to be modied (leading to non-expected
utility or multiple priors models) or supplemented with heuristics derived
from experience of decisions made under conditions of bounded awareness
2Here knowledge is interpreted in the modal-logical sense appropriate to a state-space
model of the world. A proposition is known to be true if it is true in every state of the
world that may possibly hold.
13(the precautionary principle is a prominent example.of such a heuristic).
In summary, Bayesian decision theory provides an appealing basis for
reasoning and choice for an unboundedly rational individual, capable of for-
mulating a prior distribution over all possible events, and updating it in the
light of new information. In practice, however, boundedly rational individ-
uals can apply Bayesian reasoning only within `small worlds' in the sense
described by Savage (1954). That is, a boundedly rational Bayesian will
dene particular subproblems for which she judges that a well-dened prior
over relevant states (the projections of events in the larger world) is available,
and will then apply Bayesian decision theory to these subproblems. The lim-
itation to small worlds raises the problem of determining conditions under
which Bayesian updating is valid, and what response is reasonable if these
conditions are not satised.
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic model within which both the
discovery of new propositions and the updating of probability beliefs takes
place over time. Using this model, we have considered independence condi-
tions for newly discovered propositions under which the restricted Bayesian
approach to probability updating is valid.
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